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Explaining Asset Prices with External Habits and Wage
Rigidities in a DSGE Model.1
This paper is a progress report on understanding the relationship between
prices and allocations of risks on financial markets versus macroeconomic
choices and allocations. In this paper, I investigate the scope of a model
with exogenous habit formation – or “catching up with the Joneses”, see
Abel (1990) – to generate the observed equity premium as well as other key
macroeconomic facts. Along the way, I derive restrictions for four out of eight
parameters for a rather general preference specification of habit formation by
imposing consistency with long-run growth, the leisure share, the aggregate
Frisch elasticity of labor supply, the observed risk-free rate, and the observed
Sharpe ratio.
The high reward for holding risk on financial markets implies that the
stochastic discount factor of the marginal investor shows large fluctuations,
which are highly correlated with aggregate risk. Models with a representative
agent - to which this paper belongs - therefore require, that risk aversion,
measured appropriately, must be high. That alone, however is not enough:
when economic choices are endogenous, agents typically have the possibility
to insulate the risk-sensitive dimensions of their preferences against aggregate
risk.
Thus, the literature on generating both asset pricing facts as well as
macroeconomic facts within one model has increasingly pointed to labor mar-
ket frictions as possibly important for a joint explanation. Endogenous labor
1This research was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through the
SFB 649 “Economic Risk”. I am grateful to Fatih Guvenen for useful feedback.
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supply decisions on a frictionless labor market provide agents with an insur-
ance device against fluctuations in consumption. This insurance possibility
then renders these models incapable of generating high Sharpe ratios or eq-
uity premia, unless additional frictions on labor markets such as separated
labor markets or wage rigidities are introduced, see e.g. Lettau and Uh-
lig (2000), Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001), Guvenen (2003) or Uhlig
(2006). Furthermore, wage rigidities have recently been emphasized as key
to understanding aggregate fluctuations more generally, see e.g. Hall (2005),
Shimer (2005) and Blanchard and Gali (2005). I shall therefore pay partic-
ular attention to the role of wage rigidities here.
1 The model
I shall use small letters to denote the choices of an individual agent, and
capital letters to denote economy-wide averages per agent. Production is
organized by firms, hiring labor and renting capital from households at a
market wage Wt and a market dividend Dt. I assume that production is







Wt = (1 − θ)Yt/Nt, Dt = θYt/Kt−1(2)
Technology zt evolves according to a random walk with drift,
zt = γzt−1 + ǫt(3)
where I shall assume in the linearized version of the model, that ǫt is normally
iid with standard deviation σǫ.
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where ct and lt denote consumption and leisure, and β, ν, η, A are parameters,
satisfying ν > 0, η > ν/(ν + 1) to assure monotonicity and concavity on
the domain. She is endowed with initial capital k−1 and one unit of time
per period, which can be used as labor or leisure. She maximizes these
preferences over choices of investment, consumption and labor, taking as
given the “exogenous habits” of Ht for consumption and Ft for leisure as
well as real wages Wt for labor and dividends Dt for providing capital to
firms,
1 = nt + lt(5)
ct + xt = Dtkt−1 + Wtnt(6)
kt =
(







δ̃ = δ + eγ − 1(8)
I assume that the adjustment cost function g(·) satisfies




for some ξ > 0, see Jermann (1998). The exogenous habits evolve according
to
Ht = e
γ ((1 − ζ)χCt−1 + ζHt−1)(10)
Ft = (1 − φ)ψLt−1 + φFt−1(11)
where Ct and Lt are aggregate average levels of consumption and leisure.
There is an extra constant γ in the specification for Ht which is tied to the
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productivity growth rate in (3). I do this for algebraic simplicity. Exoge-
nous habits give rise to externalities, which may be corrected with taxes, see
Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000): I shall ignore this issue here.
I assume that labor markets are demand constrained. The usual first-






A(lt − Ft)1−ν + lt − Ft
(12)
at the friction-free wage W ft . Due to some unmodelled friction, I assume
that not all labor supply reaches the market. I assume that the steady state
supply of labor is fixed at some exogenously imposed level below the level
of the frictionless economy. Locally around the steady state, households are









This is a real wage ridity as recently postulated by e.g. Hall (2005) and
Shimer (2005). The particular specification here follows Blanchard and Gali
(2005). Note that the frictionless scenario is included as a special case for
µ = 0.
An equilibrium is defined in the usual way, except for imposing that
labor markets are demand-constrained. In particular, individual choices will
coincide with aggregate choices, e.g. ct = Ct, and I shall now drop the
distinction between the two. One can show that there is a steady state in
the productivity-detrended variables C̃t = Ct/ exp(zt−1) and similarly k̃t, H̃t,
W̃t, W̃
f
t , Ỹt and the stationary variables Lt, Ft, Nt. I denote this steady state
with bars.
Assuming that t counts quarters, I shall set δ = 0.015, γ = 0.0075,
θ = 0.33, as is common, implying a nonstochastic growth rate of 3% per
4
year. I shall also impose on my choice of preferences parameters, that they
are consistent with a nonstochastic return of R̄ = 1.01 and a share of time





R̄ − 1 + δ









which will be useful below. The eight preference parameters (A, β, η, ν, χ, ζ, ψ, φ)
shall now be constrained by two assumptions already made and by two fur-
ther observations: the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and the Sharpe ratio.
2 Constraints on preferences
2.1 Macroeconomic constraints
Consider a more general preference specification with a per-period felicity
function u(ct−Ht, lt−Ft). Impose that leisure is constant along the balanced
growth path. This implies that
u((ct − Ht, lt − Ft) =





for some function v(·) and up to the intercept and scaling. For a log-
linear approximation, the derivatives of log v(·) and log v′(·) around the
steady state characterize this function sufficiently. In my specification, I
set v(lt − Ft) = A + (lt − Ft)
ν . Thus, my habit preference specification is
general up to a second-order approximation, subject to obeying the balanced
growth condition for preferences of the form (15). For algebraic convenience,
define





(1 + α)(1 − ψ)
,(16)
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where the inequality ought to be strict in order to induce the labor market to
be demand-constrained, and where the latter equality derives from the first-
order conditions of the firm and steady state substitutions. This equation
delivers my first constraint
1
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Let τ be the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, which I shall treat here as the
elasticity of desired labor supply with respect to a change in the frictionless
wage, holding marginal utility of consumption constant. Given preference













After some calculation, I obtain the second constraint
ν = 1 − (1 − ψ)Υ(χ, η)(21)
I will use this equation to calculate the implied value for ν. Note that ν > 0
for all ψ ∈ [0, 1), χ ∈ [0, 1) and η > 1, if τ > τ = (1 − N̄)κ/(N̄(κ + 1)).
2.2 Asset pricing constraints
Let Rt+1 be the return on some asset between period t and t + 1. The Lucas










λt = uc,t = (ct − Ht)
−η(A + (lt − Ft)
ν)1−η(23)
For the nonstochastic growth path (although not for the average risk-free
rate in the stochastic economy), this implies the third constraint
β = eηγR̄−1(24)
Define the news,
ǫλ,t+1 = log(λt+1) − Et[log(λt+1)](25)
and define similarly ǫR,t+1, ǫc,t+1 and ǫl,t+1. Let σλ, σR, ρλ,R be the standard
deviations of ǫλ,t+1 and ǫR,t+1 and their correlation. Define similarly σc, σl
and ρc,l. I assume homoskedasticity throughout. Let r
f
t be the logarithm of
the risk-free return from t to t + 1. Define the Sharpe ratio
SR =





Assuming joint normality in (22) delivers
SR = −ρλ,rσλ(27)
see Lettau-Uhlig (2002) for a detailed derivation. The maximally possible
Sharpe ratio therefore is
SR = σλ(28)
In asset pricing, distributional assumptions and the choice of numerical
approximation methods are not innocuous, see e.g. Judd and Guo (2001) and
Weitzmann (2005). Also, nonlinearities are key for Campbell and Cochrane
(1999) to explain a number of facts jointly. Finally, the linear habit preference
specification in (4) can generate an ill-defined maximization problem, unless
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the shock process is sufficiently restricted. Resolving these issues is beyond
the scope of this paper. Rather, these remarks shall serve as a caveat for the
log-linear approach pursued here. This approach has the advantage of being
well-understood and imposing a tight discipline on the exercise.
To a log-linear approximation,
ǫλ,t+1 = −η̃ǫc,t+1 + ν̃ǫl,t+1(29)


















which is my forth constraint. Note that ν̃ = 0, if η̃σc = SR, which is the
benchmark case of no influence of leisure on asset pricing, and holds for
separable preferences, η = 1.
3 Numerical strategy and results
3.1 Parameterization
The observations above constrain the preference parameters (α, β, η, ν, χ, ψ),
leaving two degrees of freedom. I use (χ, ψ) to parameterize this solution
manifold. I assume that the demand-constraint on labor markets is moderate
and I shall therefore treat (18) as equality. Replace ν̃/η̃ in (30) with (18),
imposing equality there. Given χ, equation (30) is a quadratic equation in η,
which generally has two solutions. I shall use the solution to the right of the
minimum. If χ is sufficiently small – which means χ ≤ 0.97 in the numerical
calculations – this results in η > 1. Calculate Υ(η, χ) and therefore ν in
(21). Find α from (19) with equality. Find β from (24), where I allow β > 1.
Check ν > 0, η > ν/(ν + 1) and α > −1 or start over with a new (χ, ψ).
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For equation (30) I shall use SR = 0.15 as the quarterly Sharpe ratio. On
an annual basis, this implies a Sharpe ratio of approximately 0.3, which is
lower than the usual 0.5 ratio quoted in the literature, but appropriate here,
given the definition in term of log-returns. I use σc = 0.67%, σl = 0.45% and
ρc,l = −0.33, calculated from taking first-differences of the log-series rather
than innovation standard deviations, which would be more appropriate. For
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, I use a value of 3.
The remaining free parameters are thus (χ, ψ, ζ, φ, ξ, µ, σǫ). I always
rescale σǫ so that the HP-filtered volatility of ouput equals 2. For the other
parameters, I conducted a hyperparameter search, using a grid for each of
these six parameters. The goal is to find parameter constellations which en-
dogenously deliver a quarterly Sharpe ratio of 0.15, a risk-free rate volatility
of 1.7%, a ratio of consumption volatility to output volatility of 0.47, a ra-
tio of investment volatility to output volatility of 3.95 and a ratio of labor
volatility to output volatility of 1.03. I minimize a criterion function, impos-
ing a weight of 1 on squared deviations for all values, except using a weight of
50 for the Sharpe ratio. I exclude solutions with explosive behaviour (which
may happen with β > 1) or other numerical problems.
For the grid, I use 0, .3, .6, .8, .9, .95, .97 for both habit level parameters χ
and ψ. I use 0, .1, .2, .3, .5, .7, .9 for both habit persistence parameters φ and
ζ. I set ξ−1 = 0, .05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.5, 1. Finally, I use µ = .2, .3, .35, .4, .6, .8.
The overall minimum has been found at ψ = 0.97, χ = 0.8, ζ = φ = 0, ξ−1 =
0.1, µ = 0.35 implying η = 7, ν = 1.5, β = 1.04, α = 4.3, while the minimum
without sticky wages was found at ψ = 0.9, χ = 0.97, ζ = 0, φ = 0.7, ξ−1 =
0.2. Apparently, habit persistence is not needed (i.e. ζ = φ = 0), if sticky
wages are allowed for. The required degree of wage stickiness is moderate.
When wages are restricted to be flexible, it seems important to allow for
9
considerable persistence in leisure habit.
At the overall minimum, the model simulations deliver SR = 0.25 on
an annualized basis, σr = 1.84, σc/σy = 0.85, σn/σy = 0.81, σx/σy = 2.22,
σǫ/0.172 = 1.63, corr(c,y)= 0.91, corr(n,y) = 0.73 and corr(x,y) = 0.84,where
e.g. σc now denotes the volatility of HP-filtered consumption. These numbers
are close to the data. The model delivers both the observed Sharpe ratio as
well as a moderate risk-free rate volatility. Consumption fluctuates more
in the model than what is observed in the data, while investment fluctuates
less. Also, I need the fluctuations in the productivity innovations to be about
60% higher than what is traditionally assumed. This may simply reflect the
necessity for shocks that have not been included here yet.
At the flexible wage minimum, the model simulations deliver SR = 0.08
on an annualized basis, σr = 2.12, σc/σy = 0.31, σn/σy = 0.66, σx/σy = 2.69,
σǫ/0.172 = 1.37, corr(c,y)= 0.72, corr(n,y) = 0.94 and corr(x,y) = 0.62. Now,
the Sharpe ratio is just a quarter of what it ought to be, despite giving this
particular target a high weight in the criterion function. Apparently, it is
hard to match the observed Sharpe ratio without giving up considerably on
other quantitative implications of the model.
In summary, a DSGE model with (exogenous and lagged) habits in both
leisure and consumption, but not necessarily with additional persistence, is
well capable of matching the observed asset market facts as well as macro
facts, provided one allows for moderate real wage stickiness and provided one
allows for sufficient curvature on preferences, as dictated by the asset market
observations. Without wage stickiness, delivery on both the asset pricing
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